Turkish and Israeli Relations and the Eastern Mediterranean Region
DEVELOPMENTS
During October and November 2010, an unexpected friendship has emerged in the Mediterranean. Increased politico-military cooperation between Israel and Greece has been raising eyebrows in the region and around the world. Once cool towards Israel because of its traditionally-good relations with the Arab world, Greece permitted Israeli air force exercises in Greek airspace in mid-October. Then, on October 18, 2010, the two nations signed a civilian aviation agreement, the first bilateral treaty between Israel and Greece in sixty years.
Israel seeks greater cooperation with Greece to maintain a security alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean in the wake of soured relations with Turkey. Relations between Turkey and Israel – already fractured after the 2008 raid on Gaza – were decidedly exacerbated and arguably eviscerated by the May 2010 Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid ship. Observers have noted that Turkey, historically considered Israel’s strongest ally in the region, has shifted its foreign policy and altered the strategic balance in the region. Israel’s warming relations with Greece suggest that a power shift may be afoot.
BACKGROUND
Turkey and Israel long enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship based on security, trade, and tourism, but relations between these two strategic partners have been tested since the election of Turkish President’s Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist AK Party in 2002. Erdogan has unleashed public and vocal criticism of Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Diplomatic tensions heightened in January 2010, when Israeli officials summoned the Turkish ambassador to explain Erdogan’s criticisms. At that meeting, Israel eschewed traditional diplomatic measures by failing to place the Turkish flag on the table between them and by intentionally sitting the Turkish ambassador at a low couch. Debunking any interpretation that the slight was unintentional, Israel officials ask the press to note the absence of traditional diplomatic niceties. Turkey demanded an apology and threatened to pull its ambassador.
In late May 2010, Israeli commandos intercepted and boarded a Gaza-bound, Turkish-flagged aid ship. Once on-board, the Israeli commandos clashed with pro-Palestinian activists, killing eight Turks and one Turkish-American. Israel maintained that its actions were lawful and proportionate, and insisted that its soldiers had come under attack by activists wielding metal rods, slingshots, knives and pistols. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu decried the raid as “like 9/11 for Turkey” and likened Israeli forces to “pirates off the coast of Somalia.” He further characterized Israel’s actions as “murder conducted by a state” and announced that Turkey would recall its ambassador and cease all military exercises with Israel.
A report issued by the UN Human Rights Council condemned the Israeli attack, calling Israel’s actions “unlawful,” “disproportionate” and unnecessarily brutal. The Israeli government dismissed the UN findings as biased and one-sided. A spokesperson for Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman called the response to the flotilla “an excuse” for a broader shift in Turkish foreign policy, and said Israel was “paying the price of the new Turkish policy to receive more popularity in the Muslim world.” The comments underscored the Israeli diplomatic community’s belief that Erdogan simply “hates” Israel.
As relations with Turkey continued to erode, Israel sought an alternate partnership in the Mediterranean. In August 2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Greece. The visit marked the first ever visit by an Israeli prime minister to Greece and according to a spokesperson for Netanyahu, symbolized “new dynamism in Israeli-Greek relations”. About two months after the historic visit, Israel commenced joint training exercises with the Greek air force. Use of Greek airspace was a welcome military collaboration for Israel, which was expelled from Turkish airspace and has limited airspace of its own. On October 18, 2010, the foreign ministers signed a civil aviation treaty, the first bilateral pact between the two nations since 1952. This agreement, and the overtures that preceded it, appear to be a precursor to broader political and military cooperation.
Netanyahu told the press that the two countries were “opening a new chapter.” Israel is quick to caveat that its overtures to Greece are not a repudiation of Turkey, but rather are “part and parcel of [Israel’s] important relationships with countries in the Mediterranean.”
Israel has an additional incentive to improve relations with Greece. Two recently-discovered off-shore gas fields would provide Israel with enough gas to satisfy its domestic energy needs, with plenty of excess for export. Greece could serve as a European hub for Israel gas sale and distribution, and may also house part of an undersea pipeline linking Israel to the European Union.
Improved relations with Israel may have positive repercussions for the flailing Greek economy. Greece relies heavily on its tourism industry for revenue, and local reports estimate a 40 percent increase in Israel tourist visits to Greece. Greece may also seek greater Israel investment in Greek industry and ecological projects.
Lastly, Greece would surely benefit from Israeli weapons and military technology, should an enduring military alliance be forged.
ANALYSIS
Though relations between Greece and Israel have undergone a historic warming in recent months, Israel is right not to consider its Mediterranean alliances a zero-sum game. Greece provides a useful stop gap for Israel, but it cannot replace Israel’s long-standing strategic partnership with Turkey. Turkey’s size and NATO partnership make it a useful ally in the region. Moreover, rehabilitating relations with predominantly-Muslim Turkey would do much to repair Israel’s reputation in the international community.
Israel must maintain an open dialogue with Turkey—and Greece should encourage such a dialogue — as all three nations maintain an interest in regional stability, combating terrorism, and the Middle East peace process. Turkey, for its part, must undertake diplomatic efforts to debunk Israel’s impression that Erdogan is a fundamentalist. Reports suggest that Erdogan is posturing against Israel for domestic political gain, and that criticisms of Israel are “for domestic political consumption.” Turkey is uniquely positioned to ensure stability in the Mediterranean and to encourage constructive dialogue between Israel and the Arab world. Erdogan must ensure that his domestic agenda does not irreparably impair his ability to re-engage Israel, to the detriment of regional and international security.
Erika N. Pont is an attorney in the Washington D.C. office of McDermott Will & Emery and an adjunct professor at The George Washington University Law School.
