The No-Party Talks
DEVELOPMENTS
Whether the world is ready to admit it or not, non-proliferation in North Korea has failed. If Pyongyang were ever willing to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons – a prospect that seems more implausible in hindsight – the moment has surely passed. After cautiously observing events unfold in Libya—and, no doubt, taking into account its own political instability and moribund economy—North Korea has strengthened its resolve to hold on to its nuclear deterrent.
In the absence of an identifiable route forward for North Korean denuclearization, the rest of East Asia has responded with little more than a knowing sigh and a collective shrug. Sure, China has maintained the pretense of the Six Party Talks, the negotiating mechanism that has lain dormant since North Korea’s last nuclear test in 2009 – all the better to justify its continued coddling of Pyongyang. But neither Washington nor Seoul has much incentive to head back to the negotiating table, and neither country seems to believe that North Korea will ever give up its hard-won nuclear weapons program, at least so long as the Kim clan is running the show. Seoul and Washington have belatedly come to realize that, if Pyongyang won’t give up its nukes, then what’s the point of talking? Even Pyongyang has resisted the urge to test another nuclear device in the last two years, lest South Korean pique finally turn into action.
For the last year, South Korea has publicly debated the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weaponry to the Korean peninsula, as well as the development of indigenous nuclear capabilities. While public sentiment in South Korea has largely supported the adoption of a more robust nuclear posture, such discussion is intended more for the benefit of North Korea, whose recent spate of provocations has concerned many in Seoul and Washington. To its credit, Seoul has decided for the moment that a nuclear South Korea would only lead to greater instability on the Korean peninsula.
BACKGROUND
For the foreseeable future, there seem to be no prospects for denuclearization through the Six Party Talks. Seoul continues to demand as a precondition for further negotiations that Pyongyang issue apologies for the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan naval corvette and the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island; Pyongyang continues to deny any involvement in the Cheonan sinking and claims South Korea brought it upon itself at Yeonpyeong. In the meantime, Washington has steadfastly stood by its ally in Seoul, showing very little interest in being sold the same old bag of North Korean goods.
Despite the lack of communication, any remaining questions about Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities and intentions after its second nuclear test in 2009 were effectively answered last autumn, when Pyongyang revealed its surprisingly advanced uranium enrichment facilities with centrifuges that bore the markings of foreign assistance. It is not surprising, then, that the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, published a letter earlier this month documenting that North Korea had bribed Pakistani military officials with over $3 million for the country’s uranium enrichment centrifuge technology in as early as 1998. In other words, Pyongyang’s nuclear duplicity has been going on for well over a decade, to say nothing of North Korea’s enablers in Pakistan.
Events this year have only hardened North Korea’s resolve to hold on to its nuclear deterrent. Domestically, economic malfeasance has undermined official propaganda that promises North Korea will become “a strong and prosperous country” by 2012.
A tenuous dynastic power shift to Kim Jong-il’s son, Kim Jong-un, and the resulting uncertainty at the top of the regime may also be to blame for a recent uptick in North Korean brinksmanship. Given this domestic dynamic, North Korea’s nukes are not just a bargaining chip; they are the only thing standing between the regime and the gallows.
Further evidence of this mentality can be found on the geopolitical front, where Pyongyang has watched attentively as NATO has carried out a bombing campaign in Libya. Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, relinquished his pursuit of nuclear weapons to great international fanfare back in 2003, only to see French and American bombers return eight years later. This fact has certainly not been lost on the North Koreans, who have noted Gaddafi’s fate with less surprise than vindication. “The truth that one should have power to defend peace has been confirmed once again,” North Korea’s official mouthpiece fumed in March after the NATO bombing campaign began.
For its part, North Korea’s most important backer, Beijing, has done very little of substance to encourage denuclearization, despite its consistent verbal championing of the Six Party Talks. Private efforts to curb Pyongyang’s bad behavior have been followed by public statements of support and unending friendship. This month marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation and has seen China actually boost its trade and aid ties with North Korea.
Where some see isolation and despotism in North Korea, the leadership in Beijing continues to see the potential for collapse. Pyongyang also knows that Beijing will continue to prioritize stability in North Korea over denuclearization, and the North Koreans have acted accordingly – moderating their behavior only far enough to keep Chinese energy imports and food aid flowing. After having stayed away from China from 1983 to 2000, Kim Jong-il has paid three visits to the mainland in little over a year, each time praising Chinese economic reforms but quickly forgetting these lessons by the time he returns home.
Still, China is not happy with North Korea’s nuclear shenanigans and has made its views known. Beijing rightfully fears that a North Korean bomb could spark a regional arms race, one that would see South Korea and Japan develop their own nuclear deterrents – to say nothing of Taiwan. This scenario is obviously anathema to the leadership in Beijing, but, for the time being, it is also unrealistic.
ANALYSIS
Indeed, the last two decades have shown that North Korea’s bellicosity and “military first” policy are nothing more than Pyongyang’s response to deeply felt threats from all sides. Upping the ante on the Korean peninsula would only fuel North Korean insecurities and make Pyongyang’s behavior more unpredictable. It remains a far better policy for the U.S. and South Korea to ignore North Korea’s nuclear capability entirely. If Seoul refuses to negotiate over nuclear weapons that Pyongyang will never give up anyway, then North Korea’s leaders will be robbed of much of their leverage.
Ultimately, reining in North Korea’s behavior will mean addressing Pyongyang’s underlying security concerns. This will require Seoul and Washington to guarantee the regime’s survival, something which neither country is prepared to do. In this regard, a nuclear North Korea may actually serve to stabilize relations on the Korean peninsula: Pyongyang will have the security guarantee it has long sought in the form of a nuclear deterrent, and Seoul can wait out regime change in North Korea while focusing on mitigating smaller acts of aggression in the meantime. Among the unpalatable policy options before the government in Seoul, containment of North Korea is surely the least reprehensible.
With Washington’s backing, Seoul has done a credible job of convincing Pyongyang and its backers in Beijing that the next provocation may very well be the last. These warnings seem to have curtailed North Korean misbehavior for the time being. However, with U.S. and South Korean presidential elections looming and a once-in-a-decade leadership transition in China, next year promises to be an even more eventful year on the Korean peninsula. The rest of the region can only hope that, if the leadership in North Korea fails to live up to its pledge of creating “a strong and prosperous country” by 2012, then all the nuclear weapons in the world will not save the regime from its greatest threat of all – accountability.
—
Jeremy Chan works as an analyst at the SK China Economic Research Institute in Beijing. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
