Sudan: Separation Anxiety, Nervousness and Fear
DEVELOPMENTS
During a Fall 2008 episode of the continuing Somali pirate saga, Sugale Ali, a representative of the band of pirates that hijacked the Ukrainian cargo ship MV Faina, was repeating his group’s demand for twenty million dollars. The American Navy kept a close watch, as were others; this entanglement played on a much larger scale than previous instances of coastal piracy. The ship contained 33 T-72 tanks, the most sophisticated materiel in the Soviet-era arsenal, allegedly destined for southern Sudan, via Kenya. Negotiators managed to break a deal down to three million dollars, without understanding corresponding dynamics – a weaponized southern Sudan.
Yet, while speculations of a costly and violent war continue to be promulgated, many hope that the upcoming January 2011 Sudanese (Google satellite-monitored) referenda will end decades of animosity for good.
Several new realities will unfold in a continent that has witnessed highly-disputed vote results in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and recently, Ivory Coast. A new batch of mediators from the African Union, the Arab League, South Africa, and Eastern African countries are working hard to help make the Sudanese transition nonviolent, as oil-rich southern Sudan secedes from the Arabized north. Leaders on both sides have assured all concerned they would accept the results. Until then, the suspense continues.
BACKGROUND
Present-day Sudan is a patchwork of various ethnic groups, religions, languages, and territories, held together by the colonial logic of Pax Britannica – a logic that created the largest country in Africa. The north, a part of the old Nubian civilization that once subdued ancient Egypt, became Arabized with the spread of Islam and the settlement and inter-marriage of Sufi families locally.
The south, instead, consisted of different tribes practicing traditional belief systems; they later converted to Christianity, remaining relatively inaccessible before the Anglo-Egyptian push to control the area in the 19th Century. Geographically, the current southern Sudan includes ten states that were parts of the former provinces of Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile. Three states, Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile are contested, and their destinies are expected to be determined by separate referenda. English remains the most preferred second-language in polyglot southern Sudan, in contrast to Arabic in the north.
Anticipating independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1956, a war broke out between the separately-administered south and north. Conflict came to a short end in 1972, with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted southern Sudan autonomy. The status quo did not last longer than a decade, however. Having overthrown the government of Ismail al-Azhari (1964-1969) in Khartoum, the American-educated General Jaafar Nimeiri reversed the autonomy, in favor of inclusion in a pan-Sudanese federal system in 1983. The longest war to date in the country’s history, the conflict came to a resolution with a power-sharing arrangement that gave cabinet positions to members of SPLM (Sudanese People’s Liberation Army led by John Garang).
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), sponsored by East African countries, allowed for the south to create its own government, maintain a professional army, and share revenues from the newly-discovered oil that is pumped to the Red Sea through northern Sudan. The CPA stipulated that a five-year window period should enable the two parties to prepare for a referendum determining whether the south will stay with the north.
The GoSS (Government of Southern Sudan) is seated in Juba, about 1200 miles south of Sudan’s capital Khartoum. From it early history as an outpost of an Ottoman Turkish garrison in the 19th century, this booming city owes the establishment of its core business district to the Greek merchants that settled in the area from 1922. Currently, a number of Kenyan and Eastern African businesses provide much-needed services in this capital that hosts international observers preparing to monitor the January 9 referenda.
What makes the power brokers in Sudan different this time, in this third round, is their composition and level of interest in the fate of the country. The African Union, Arab countries, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD – representing the horn of Africa) spearheaded the negotiation processes, while the European Union and the United States played a less direct role. Thabo Mbeki, former South African president and favored elder of the African Union, outlined four options, including full independence and open borders.
IGAD countries — neighbors with more at stake than the others — chose a more careful stance, emphasizing unity and independence are both possibilities they can live with, as long as the referenda guarantee peaceful transition.
Arab neighbors Libya and Egypt shuttled back and forth with a proposal that promised confederation, which was summarily rejected after a brief consideration. Egypt rightly worries about the future of its share of the water from the Nile that cuts across Sudan, before reaching the green fields near Cairo. (An independent southern Sudan could very well align itself with the eastern African signatories of the recently-inked agreement that challenges the water quotas of Sudan and Egypt. )
Perhaps sensing the stronger likelihood of independence, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, already on the wanted list of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide in Darfur, declared he would recognize southern Sudan if results disfavored unity. Egypt and China (buyer of most of the oil from southern Sudan) similarly made an about-face and publicly voiced their support for independence. Regardless of verbal assurances, the preparatory homework leading up to the votes (such as border demarcation and oil-revenue sharing) has yet to be completed, with less than two weeks to go. What’s more, the GoSS disputed the results of the 2008 Sudanese census it claims undercounted southern Sudan’s population, which was one of the preconditions. As concerns Khartoum, Rabie Abdelato Obeid, a senior northern Sudanese official, already hinted that independence will only be “political secession.”
ANALYSIS
The eyes of the world seem to be focused on the fateful January 9, 2011 date of southern Sudan’s referendum. However, it is less than crystal clear if Khartoum is willing to grant southern Sudan more than a semantic independence, especially in the presence of a myriad of unresolved key issues. The messages from northern Sudan are conflicting, and officials of GoSS are quick to send out rebuttals on controversial matters.
Trading accusations in the midst of a pivotal event that potentially transforms not only Sudan, but also the larger Eastern African region, inevitably causes anxiety. Of course, the loss of huge oil revenues is a hard pill to swallow for Al-Bashir’s party, as is the likelihood of another costly war with a better-armed southern Sudan. The referenda are only the uneasy beginning of a long road to peace or a renewed war. Thus, while it is crucial to get both parties to commit to a peaceful solution, it is even more important for mediators to continue exerting tremendous effort on follow-up and application. Arab and sub-Saharan African nations in particular should also be willing to do continued handholding, without heavily de-prioritizing their own vital interests.
Mohammed Hamid Mohammed is the Africa Regional Editor of Foreign Policy Digest.
