❮   HOME

Special Feature: 18 Days That (May Have) Changed the World

Special Feature: 18 Days That (May Have) Changed the World

In the past two months, the Middle East has changed drastically. The recent acts of protest, demonstration, and revolution throughout the region not only marked a new chapter in its tumultuous history, but astonished, inspired, and inevitably confused American and European citizens and leaders alike. Major news outlets and international personalities have spoken of “Youth Uprisings,” “The Awakening of the Silent Majority,” “Dictators,” “American Influence,” “Corruption,” “Unemployment,” “Low Wages and Rising Prices,” “War Crimes,” “Police States,” and “Radical Islam,” but what does any of this really mean? Given everything that has occurred, how do we explain what we have seen and predict what will come?

The answer is, we don’t; not today. The situation in the Middle East is currently far too dynamic for anyone to accurately forecast the end result. The best we can do is combine previous knowledge of the region with critical on-the-ground observation and thoughtful analysis to eliminate some outcomes and highlight others that appear to be more likely. From Cairo, this article is an attempt to do so.

History

The history of modern Egypt, like much of the Middle East, is a history that cannot be told without mentioning Europe and the United States. British and French colonialism, and later American influence, has left a decisive mark on Egyptian history, going back as far as July 1798, when Napoleon’s Army of the Orient first landed at Marabout, near Alexandria. Today, French and British flags in the region fly only above their respective embassies, yet Western political, economic, cultural, and military influence remain.

In Egypt, the Mubarak regime was an embodiment of this reliance on the West for thirty years, receiving roughly $30 billion in U.S. military aid since 1981 – the second largest quantity given to any country in the world, behind only Israel. Additionally, in recent years, a much larger proportion of overall aid has been directed towards the Egyptian military, rather than the Egyptian economy.

Through 18 days of public demonstrations and protests, the Egyptian people took the first step in freeing themselves from the burden of the Mubarak regime’s oppression. In ousting Mubarak on February 11, 2011, they simultaneously denounced tyranny and corruption at home; demanded increased political and economic rights; and rejected Western influence in their domestic affairs. Inspired by these events in Egypt and the previous uprisings in Tunisia, the countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, and most recently Libya, have witnessed similar demonstrations and demands for reform.

Although Tunisia’s uprising may have sparked similar movements throughout the region, each has its own unique domestic history. In Egypt, for example, allegations of corruption and violence surrounding the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections were one catalyst of resistance to the Mubarak regime. Realistic political alternatives to both Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood – a political dichotomy subject to a great deal of focus in the West – began to form. Opposition parties and coalitions such as al-Ghad (Tomorrow) and Kifaya! (Enough!) were established. Though limited, influential blogs and youth movements began to appear, spearheading Egyptian resistance to the regime.

Thus, January 25, 2011 – the first day of protests in Egypt – was not only the first day in the story of the historic revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak’s regime and inspired demonstrations throughout the Middle East. It was also the culmination of an evolution of thought amongst the Egyptian people, one which united them both against the regime, and in many ways, against foreign influence in their domestic affairs.

The Military

After weeks of turmoil and despair which seemed to culminate in a day of sheer euphoria, Hosni Mubarak’s resignation left a slew of unanswered questions in its wake. Who was running the country? What were their goals? What did this mean for Egyptian foreign relations? When, if ever, would the problems that sparked the unrest be addressed? And what of the Egyptian Constitution?

To a great degree, these questions have yet to be answered. The process of governance and reform, like Egyptian thought and practice for much of the past decade, is an evolution in progress. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, headed by Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, has assumed governance of the country. Here in Cairo, however, rumors abound of division between the upper echelons of the military – an older generation trained by the Soviet Union, and considered by many to be hold-overs of the Mubarak regime – and the younger, more independent officer class, much of which was trained by the U.S.

Nonetheless, even if all levels of the military are marching in lock step, it is still unclear where they are marching to. In their second communiqué, before former Vice-President Omar Suleiman had announced Mubarak’s resignation, the army assured the people that they would, “lift the state of emergency once the current situation ends; adjudicate electoral challenges and the resulting procedures; introduce necessary legislative amendments; and hold free and fair presidential elections under the agreed constitutional amendments.”

Only time will tell whether this will come to pass. The Egyptian Constitution is now essentially dead letter, having been discarded when power transferred to the military. For much of February, a group of legal experts convened to amend the Constitution and prepare it for popular ratification, but this process, no matter how furiously spurred on by an anxious and self-conscious military, will take months to complete.

In the meantime, the military will continue to oversee both domestic and foreign affairs. The burden of governance falls squarely on their shoulders, and changes in policy are already evident.

In the international arena, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has reopened the Suez Canal to Iranian warships for the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Egyptian military’s decision has caused Israel to question the nature of future Israeli-Egyptian relations and the stability of their long maintained peace. Many Egyptians here in Cairo have argued that the Israelis have nothing to fear from them, that they are a peaceful people. However, the relationship between the two countries, they insist, will no longer be “one-sided,” with Israel receiving economic and military aid from Egypt.

Indeed, Egyptian gas – previously transported through Sinai to Israel and sold there for a fraction of the global market rate – has been cut off in the past weeks. Surely, neither the use of the Suez Canal by Iranian naval vessels, nor the end of the flow of gas to Israel, would have occurred if U.S. diplomacy still held the sway it did under the Mubarak regime.

As for domestic policy, addressing the economic reform and political representation demands of the people will take some time. Despite the military’s wealth, organization, and influence, creating permanent solutions to these demands seems to be beyond its capabilities. Although the military maintains significant influence in manufacturing and other industries – all of which have allegedly made military leaders millions, at the expense of the Egyptian people – economic policy historically falls outside its purview. It appears that changing this precedent is not a top priority.

The People
Egypt is clearly not the same as it was before January 25. To those familiar with the country, an unprecedented unity of opinion, and attitude of strength and accomplishment, is evident, though serious problems still exist. Workers’ strikes and demonstrations have become a regular occurrence, affecting institutions from the American University in Cairo to the Ministry of the Interior. Nearly two full weeks after Mubarak resigned, protesters at the Ministry burned a number of cars and a portion of the building, before the army intervened.

The politicization of the opposition has also begun, not necessarily in the street, but certainly amongst political parties, as groups have begun to voice their individual demands and marshal support for their leaders. Furthermore, large demonstrations of both celebration and protest against martial law and Mubarak regime holdovers have continued in Tahrir Square every Friday since Mubarak’s resignation, defying formal military orders that protests cease and people return to their daily lives. Through all of this, Egypt’s impoverished lower class – those too poor to even make it to the protests in many cases – have largely remained voiceless.

Lessons from Cairo

Despite the extraordinary developments of the past few months, the future of Egypt remains uncertain. So, what can the realities in Egypt teach us about the rest of the region? First and foremost, they highlight the power of the people, long neglected and oppressed in much of the Middle East.

Second, they offer vivid proof of the secular and national roots of these movements. While the Muslim Brotherhood did participate in Egypt’s uprising, albeit belatedly, its role was neither one of leadership, nor coordination.

Third, Egypt’s protests exposed in broad daylight the oppressive nature and tactics of many of the regimes in the region. The use of plain-clothed thugs and criminals to incite violence in Tahrir Square, and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s employment of African mercenaries against his own people, are acts of the same mold, if not degree.

Fourth, events in Egypt show that domestic nation-building, just like nation-building from afar, cannot be completed overnight. Even after the fall of the Mubarak regime, the democratic ideals fought for are still at stake. Long-term success and the achievement of these goals will require the populations to continue to pressure their respective governments and insist on substantive reforms.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Egyptian protests have shown that the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, long assumed by many to be the inevitable result of two irreconcilable cultures, is a construct from our past, not a guarantee for our future. The protesters here and throughout the Middle East have demanded freedom from oppression, increased economic opportunity, greater political representation, and respect for individual human rights – all values which the West treasures and indeed, in many cases, fought revolutions of its own over. In a word, Egyptians have fought for Self-Determination, freedom from both domestic and international interference.

The eighteen days from January 25 to February 11 definitively altered the Middle East. How the international community responds will determine whether or not they can change the world.

Thomas Plofchan is an M.A. candidate in the Middle East Studies program at the American University in Cairo. He currently lives in Cairo, Egypt, and writes a blog on Middle Eastern societies, politics and culture at www.afewdaysabroad.wordpress.com.

facebook
google_buzz
twitter
yahoo_buzz
rss
print
bookmark
email

About the Author

Thomas Plofchan