Russian Nuclear Exports: Balancing Nonproliferation with National Interest
DEVELOPMENTS
Russia has chosen to back India’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a non-treaty based group seeking to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. While the NSG in name was formed as a near-direct consequence of India’s 1974 so-called “peaceful” nuclear test, Russia and other nuclear powers are now seeking to admit New Delhi into the select group which asserts control over nuclear exports, allowing India a say into the group’s future decisions and moving to erase remaining doubt as to the legitimacy of its nuclear arsenal.
This position stands in stark contrast to the original bargain as enshrined in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): namely, that states not possessing nuclear weapons as of the treaty’s inception would forgo the legal right to atomic arms in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology. While policies such as the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear agreement and NSG exemption have yet to materially affect New Delhi’s nonproliferation policy, admitting India into the NSG without its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and voluntary cessation of fissile material production prior to the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) would practically nullify the original NPT bargain. Russia’s acceptance of India’s disregard for the existing nonproliferation regime will do much to dismantle the system surrounding the treaty, while destabilizing South Asia in the interests of Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi – read: military exports and nuclear reactor construction.
BACKGROUND
India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear test, which showcased the ability of a state to divert nuclear assistance in the interests of a bomb-producing capability, placed its nuclear efforts outside the bounds of programs recognized by the recently-adopted NPT as being legal, and helped provide the impetus for the formation of the NSG. The NSG is a “group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.” Those guidelines serve as criteria for states to either be afforded or restricted access to sensitive nuclear technology and materials.
In 2008, after more than thirty years of an effective nuclear technology and material embargo by advanced nuclear-exporting states, India was granted an exemption from specific NSG guidelines requiring recipient states to be parties to the NPT with full-scope safeguard agreements in place with the IAEA or an internationally recognized equivalent. The exemption was pushed by the United States in order to open up India’s domestic market for nuclear exports and to improve U.S.-Indian strategic relations. The United States was not the only country intending to benefit from the opening of nuclear trade with India: following the consensus passage of the exemption in the NSG, Russia and France have also taken advantage of the opportunity to invest in India’s booming nuclear energy market.
Nuclear power generation is projected to grow both relatively and absolutely, with current targets calling for nuclear power to comprise 25 percent of Indian energy consumption by around 2050, up from 2.5 percent today. Playing a major role in India’s planned nuclear expansion is Russia’s state-controlled nuclear firm, Rosatom. Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Rosatom, has announced that as of December 2010, 18 new reactors are slated for construction by the Russian firm at three separate sites in India. Along with the joint Japanese-American Firms GE-Hitachi and Toshiba-Westinghouse, Rosatom will join France’s nuclear-giant Areva in providing India with the nearly 20,000 MW – enough electrical capacity to provide power for about 1,835 U.S. households for one year – in installed nuclear generation capacity by 2020, with 63,000 MW to be added by 2032.
The 2008 NSG exemption also lifted the ban on Indian imports of uranium, which, according to a 2006 report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), was a constraining factor in the growth of India’s nuclear weapons and energy sectors. The IPFM concludes in its report that New Delhi was only able to meet about two-thirds of its uranium needs without the aid of imports. However, following the 2008 exemption by the NSG, both France and Russia inked agreements with India to supply thousands of tons of both natural uranium and uranium fuel pellets, the former being preferable for the production of plutonium.
While the NSG has worked to normalize relations with India, Pakistan has watched its foremost adversary drastically develop its conventional military capabilities with the help of Russia. The NSG has negated a key limiting variable on India’s nuclear weapons production efforts and provided de-facto recognition of New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been showcased as a case-study in how not to behave with a nuclear arsenal, highlighted by the public confession of Pakistan’s infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2004, the mastermind behind the nuclear smuggling ring that aided the illicit programs of Iran, North Korea, and Libya, to name a few.
ANALYSIS
Russia, as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) recognized by the NPT, key member of the NSG, and strategic ally with India, has a critical role to play in the impact that India’s nonproliferation policy has on South Asia and across the globe. Moscow’s decision to back India’s accession to the NSG looks to balance Moscow’s international obligations as a member of the nuclear export-control group with its national interests, namely garnering the financial benefits that accompany increasing nuclear exports and military sales. However, by supporting India’s accession to the NSG and deepening nuclear trade, Moscow may inadvertently promote further instability in South Asia and discredit the bargain between NWSs and non-NWSs implicit in the NPT – non-NWSs give up the right to nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technology.
In the eyes of Pakistan, Moscow’s relationship with India in terms of conventional weapons sales is now compounded by cooperation in the nuclear sector which could allow India to further develop and increase its nuclear arsenal. It is known that India continues to produce fissile material despite assurances given that it would support an FMCT. Therefore, in addition to possessing a significant edge over Pakistan in terms of conventional firepower, India could also be prompted to abandon its policy of a maintaining a minimum strategic deterrent, instead opting to overwhelm its neighbor and rival with nuclear superiority. This would be exceptionally dangerous if India chose to retaliate in a massive fashion for a terrorist attack in which Pakistan’s intelligence agency was implicated.
In addition to potentially destabilizing the military balance in South Asia, NSG accession by India would be a blow to the bargain enshrined in the NPT between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. Allowing India the benefits of nuclear cooperation as permitted by the 2008 NSG exemption has undoubtedly done damage to the NPT “grand bargain;” however, cementing that damage by facilitating India’s accession to the NSG would practically nullify the bargain.
Also notable here is the difference in treatment that Iran receives in terms of sanctions and scrutiny as having violated its NPT commitments, versus the outstretched hand India receives as a non-NPT signatory. Had Iran not signed and ratified the NPT it could find itself in a much more enviable position than it does today. The current situation is neither desirable nor sustainable in the long-term as the nonproliferation regime maintains its crisis-mode footing, waiting for the next nonproliferation fire to put out. As experts have noted, temporary patches and continuing resolutions are no way to deal with systemic crises. Russian nonproliferation policy officials should note that India’s bid to accede to the NSG should be taken seriously, but only as it shines a bright light on the need to reform the nonproliferation regime writ large.
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Andrew Riedy is an Alfa Fellow currently living in Moscow, Russia. He received his M.A. in Security Policy from George Washington University, specializing in nuclear proliferation and Eurasian Regional Security. He focuses his attention on the U.S.-Russian strategic security relationship and policy solutions to deal with the destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons and their proliferation.
