Room for Compromise: The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations
DEVELOPMENTS
Iran and European Union representatives have engaged in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program for the better part of the last decade. Last month, yet another round of talks failed for the same reason previous negotiations fell through: a lack of compromise on both sides. The parties’ unwillingness to make concessions has led to deadlock, as the Iranians insist upon enrichment on Iranian soil and the West demands full suspension. This demand, along with Iran’s sense of isolation due to economic sanctions, has given Iranian hardliners with the political cover to marginalize moderate viewpoints and politicians domestically, which in turn has solidified the deadlock with the Western parties.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the E.U.-3 – launched a diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program. The parties issued a statement in October 2003, known as the Tehran Declaration, whereby Iran agreed to suspend enrichment, comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (“IAEA”) investigation, and sign an Additional Protocol to its 1974 IAEA safeguards agreement. Meanwhile, the E.U.-3 recognized Iran’s right to civilian nuclear programs under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. After October 2003, Iran continued some enrichment-related activities, but agreed to the Additional Protocol in December 2003, and a more detailed suspension agreement, called the Paris Agreement, in November 2004.
Negotiations abruptly ended the next year, just as progress between Iran and the western parties appeared to gain momentum. In 2005, Hassan Rohani and Javier Solana, then the top negotiators in the nuclear talks between Iran and the E.U.-3, signed an additional agreement under which Iran was granted observer status at the WTO. In return, observers would be granted permission to flash-inspect Iran’s nuclear installations. By implementing the additional protocol, the parties hoped to find a face-saving solution that would satisfy both Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment and western demands for assurances against the diversion of nuclear material. Rohani agreed to the additional protocol in principle, and promised to facilitate its approval in parliament.
The Iranian conservative-led parliament, the Majlis, however, never ratified the additional protocol. One of the primary reasons that Rohani was unable to sell the additional protocol domestically was the unwillingness of the U.S. to make concessions to Iran, while the Europeans were incapable of meeting Iran’s security and diplomatic demands. The unilateral banking sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Iran and entities that work with Iran are the primary catalysts of Iran’s economic suffering. These sanctions deter companies from dealing with Iran, regardless of the nature of their business. The Europeans could not deliver a credible carrot to outweigh the harm caused by the U.S. sanctions, nor could they negotiate the removal of the financial sanctions that the U.S. has imposed. In addition, the American red line is – and always was – absolutely no enrichment activities, at any level, upon Iranian soil. This is – and always was – unacceptable to Iran.
Losing interest in what the Europeans could offer, Iran resumed nuclear enrichment, and Rohani, after sixteen years as Head of the National Security Council, was replaced with the younger Ali Larijani, a conservative heavyweight. At around the same time, Iran elected Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the outspoken conservative, as president of the Islamic republic. Iran turned its back on talks with the E.U.-3, and instead, turned its political focus to securing its economic interests elsewhere. Iranian newspapers called it a “Shift towards the East,” and fresh talks began with the Indian government regarding a proposed gas pipeline to replace the European market and with the Russians on expanding Iran’s nuclear program, amongst others.
In 2005, Iranian conservatives argued that Iran should resume enrichment because despite years of full suspension, western sanctions continued to target the Iranian economy. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, also rejected any talk of suspending the enrichment process. The Iranian government translated this conservative argument into ideological terms, linking defiance of western demands to resisting oppression by the west. The message was carried in fiery speeches by conservative parliamentarians, and was delivered across the country by the leaders of Friday prayers in the provinces, who were chosen by Khamenei himself.
Supporters of the conservative position also attempted to prevent a healthy, public discourse on the matter within Iran. Iranian newspapers were banned from writing about the nuclear program. Anyone critical of the nuclear enrichment policy was branded a traitor and a “western lackey.” As a result, critics could not challenge the government’s policy on grounds of Iranian national interest, or the harm inflicted upon the Iranian people by western sanctions.
The U.S. position, however, remained unchanged. Once Iran resumed enrichment, the case was referred to the U.N. Security Council in New York, where political influence is paramount. The issue was quickly entangled in the complications, intricacies, double standards and partisanship considerations of the Iran-U.S. relationship. Subsequently, the U.N. passed six resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program.
While the E.U.-3 and Iran held amicable negotiations between 2003 and 2005, at a time when reformers held power in Iran, a shaky trust between Iran and Europe made a solution to the dispute appear possible. The devil was in the details of how to rewrite the definition of “suspension,” in particular, whether suspension would apply to high-level enrichment and whether Iran would allow a high level of strictly monitored enrichment. In return, the west could hold out a carrot too big to turn down: access to the global economy.
The Europeans appear to have adopted less rigid positions than the United States throughout this period. On June 9, 2011, former British Ambassador to Iran Richard Dalton authored an article, along with five other former ambassadors, to Iran: Paul von Maltzahn of Germany, Steen Hohwü-Christensen of Sweden, Guillaume Metten of Belgium, François Nicoullaud of France and Roberto Toscano of Italy. The piece was published simultaneously both by the Guardian and the L.A. Times. These five European officials – who are also experts on Iran – wrote the following:
“We often hear that Iran’s refusal to negotiate seriously left our countries no other choice but to drag it in 2006 to the security council… In 2005 Iran was ready to discuss an upper limit for the number of its centrifuges and to maintain its rate of enrichment far below the high levels necessary for weapons. Tehran also expressed its readiness to allow intrusive inspections, even in non-declared sites. But at that time Europe and the US wanted to compel Iran to ditch its enrichment programme entirely… Iranians assume that this is still the European and US goal, and that for this reason the Security Council insists on suspension of all Iranian enrichment activities. But the goal of ‘zero centrifuges operating in Iran, permanently or temporarily’ is unrealistic, and has contributed greatly to the present standoff.”
ANALYSIS
What makes or breaks any dealings with Iran is the issue of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a matter of life and death for the Iranian regime. For this reason, the Iranian opposition seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the government by disseminating information on the illegal ways it came to power, and the violent means by which it deals with Iranian citizens. Its fading legitimacy is also why the Iranian government is willing to spend its resources, such as the budget bloated with oil dollars, on handouts to its constituents.
Legitimacy is also at the heart of the standoff between Iran and the west over nuclear enrichment. The Iranian government – and indeed most Iranian people – believes that Iran has a legitimate right to nuclear enrichment. This also strikes a chord with many across the developing world, who share the similar nationalistic sentiments. The fairness of a closed nuclear club based on power relations in existence over half a century ago is evident. Also apparent to the developing world is the double-standard applied by the U.S. toward certain countries – such as Israel and India – that it is willing to tolerate as nuclear powers, and others – such as Pakistan and Iran – that it is not.
Arguably, the U.S.’s double standard towards nuclear players across the Middle East has caused it to lose sight of its national interest in the region. Unlike Iran, the U.S. is not a rigid autocracy that needs to stir nationalist sentiment to achieve legitimacy; its policies can and should shift based on national interest and political developments. U.S. policymakers have claimed that “all options are on the table,” but at least with regards to the Iranian nuclear program, this has not been the case.
The U.S. may consider shifting its policy toward Iran by accepting low-level enrichment activities under the auspices of the IAEA and also adapting its policy toward the region as whole by advocating for a nuclear weapons-free zone across the Middle East. A nuclear weapons-free zone reflects the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and can win both pubic support and the support of most nations in the region, including Iran.
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Jason Shams is an American-Iranian who lived for 20 years in Iran, where he worked as a political analyst, journalist, and diplomatic translator and interpreter. He currently resides in Washington, DC.
