Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
DEVELOPMENTS
On January 25, 2011, popular demonstrations calling for reform began in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. From January 28 to February 11, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian citizens – determined, resilient and unified – remained in Tahrir, eventually forcing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from power. Since then, Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has governed the country ahead of anticipated parliamentary and presidential elections in September and November 2011, respectively.
In the aftermath of those 18 days, the once magnanimous and unified protest movement has fragmented and politicized. Remnants of cooperation and overwhelming Egyptian pride remain, but dividing lines have been drawn in anticipation of what could be the country’s first free parliamentary elections in decades, if ever. In this setting, the most organized and powerful group in Egypt (perhaps after only the Egyptian military) is the Muslim Brotherhood.
A leader in both worldwide Islamic ideology and domestic Egyptian politics, the Muslim Brotherhood will likely be a key player in any post-Mubarak Egyptian government. The organization has an extensive history and strong popular support base within Egypt, but both its reputation outside the country and the degree of its internal unification is unclear. The nature of the Brotherhood’s future role in Egypt’s governance and the goals it will pursue in the coming months and years remain difficult, though increasingly important, to predict and understand.
BACKGROUND
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a Sunni reform movement in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. Its ideology was guided by the following statement of purpose:
Our duty as Muslim Brothers is to work for the reform of selves, of hearts and souls by joining them to God the all-high; then to organize our society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good state. (Hassan al-Banna, The Reform of Self and Society.)
From the beginning, the group has tried to promote unity of religion and state and used the social organizations they have become known for today – such as hospitals, schools, charitable societies and cultural associations – to promote its ideology. Hassan al-Banna, taught:
We believe that Islam is an all embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on everyone its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order[.] [I]t does not stand helpless before life’s problems, nor the steps one must take to improve mankind.
Similarly, a leading Brotherhood member, Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh, echoed al-Banna’s teachings, by asserting: “We work in both rural and urban areas …The goal is to reach out to the most marginalized people in society.”
Despite its charitable work, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has often been vilified and dismissed, both in the West and at home, as a violent extremist organization. In Egypt, the Brotherhood had a tense relationship with the Mubarak regime, and has gone through stages of significant repression and temporary respite since its founding.
As a result of its experience and its development, the Brotherhood may not be as unified as it once was. There appear to be internal conflicts between the younger and older generations of the organization based on issues much more tangible than mere age, such as transparency and willingness to work with other political parties.
The organization’s engagement with violence and terrorism remains controversial. Most would acknowledge that “since the 1970’s [the Muslim Brotherhood] has not engaged in violent activity… [and] since 9/11, prominent members of the Brotherhood have renounced violence publicly and tried to distance themselves from al-Qaeda’s violent practices.” Others, however, maintain that “[a]lthough ‘there is no evidence that the Egyptian [Muslim Brotherhood] itself is now engaged in any terrorist activity’, it is not far removed from extremism: ‘The intellectual, political and geographical milieu which the [Muslim Brotherhood] inhabits means [sic] that there will always be members who move to more violent activity, even terrorism, in other organizations.”
Although its Islamic roots are more readily apparent, there has also always been a “genuine element of Egyptian ‘nationalism’ that permeates the Brotherhood’s thinking.” Thus, it was surprising that the Brotherhood was late in joining the demonstrations in Egypt earlier this year. Members officially participated for the first time on January 28 and were present in significant numbers only by February 1. That said, once present, they appear to have been influential in protecting anti-Mubarak protesters within Tahrir from pro-Mubarak forces attempting to enter the Square on February 2 and 3. For the moment, the Brotherhood’s perceived role in protecting demonstrators seems to be enough for the Egyptian people to associate and accept the organization as a part of the historic revolution, even if not a leader of it.
ANALYSIS
The Muslim Brotherhood has recently created a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, which is in a strong position vis-à-vis other political organizations competing for influence in post-Mubarak Egypt. It possesses considerable organizational capabilities and infrastructure, and commands a powerful support base, albeit one perhaps perceived in American and Europe to be more influential than it really is.
It is difficult to fully grasp the extent of this influence in Egypt. Estimates of official membership range from 100,000 to 300,000 members, but the number of highly sympathetic supporters likely to follow Brotherhood political direction has often been thought to be much greater. In light of the liberal ideals of much of Egypt’s recent protests, those who sympathized with the Brotherhood and may indeed have previously followed its political direction and supported its politicians in polls may not be as inclined to do so. Conversely, the Brotherhood’s history of contention with the Mubarak regime and developed social infrastructure could help draw the support of many previously unaffiliated Egyptian citizens.
The organization has and continues to play a major role in the country, and, as noted above, has a significant support base. The fact that they will not officially run a presidential candidate is a significant decision, but does not mean that Brotherhood members will not run independently, as they have in parliamentary elections in the past. As a result, the Brotherhood is likely to play a significant, but by no means dominant, role in Egypt’s next government. Its history and ideology will garner support from many, but also alienate it from a significant part of the Egyptian population.
In the end, this likely means that Egypt’s next government – should its leaders be chosen in free, fair, and democratic elections as anticipated – will be significantly influenced, but not dominated by, the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite stereotypes to the contrary, such a turnout would be something which liberal democratic governments could work with. Even though an Islamic-influenced democracy may be different from American or European understandings of democratic governance, it could still be a system that supports a free press, holds regular elections, divides power between different branches of the State, and accepts and indeed grows from opposition and dissent. As one regional expert has said, “Living with it won’t be easy, but it should not be seen as inevitably our enemy.”
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Thomas Plofchan is an M.A. candidate in the Middle East Studies program at the American University in Cairo. He currently lives in Cairo, Egypt, and writes a blog on Middle Eastern societies, politics and culture at www.afewdaysabroad.wordpress.com.
